Jesse Fitts

"Chalmers on the Objects of Credence", Philosophical Studies, 2014, 170: 343-358

-Abstract: Chalmers (2011a) presents an argument against “referentialism” (and for his own view) that employs Bayesianism. He aims to make progress in a debate over the objects of belief, which seems to be at a standstill between referentialists and non-referentialists. Chalmers’ argument, in sketch, is that Bayesianism is incompatible with referentialism, and natural attempts to salvage the theory, Chalmers contends, requires giving up referentialism. Given the power and success of Bayesianism, the incompatibility is prima facie evidence against referentialism. In this paper, I review Chalmers’ arguments and give some responses on behalf of the referentialist.

"Can Bayesianism Solve Frege's Puzzle?" (down for review)

-Abstract: Chalmers (2016), responding to Braun (2016), continues arguments from Chalmers (2011) for the conclusion that Bayesian considerations favor the Fregean in the debate over the objects of belief in Frege’s puzzle. In this response to Chalmers, I get to the heart of the disagreement over whether Bayesian considerations can tell us anything about Frege’s puzzle and answer, no, they do not.

"The Propositional Benacerraf Problem" (down for review)

-Abstract: Writers in the propositions literature consider the Benacerraf objection serious, often decisive. The objection figures heavily in dismissing standard theories of propositions of the past, notably set-theoretic theories. I argue that the situation is more complicated. After explicating the propositional Benacerraf problem, I focus on a classic set-theoretic theory, the possible worlds theory, and argue that methodological considerations influence the objection’s success.

"Iconic Propositions" (down for review)

-Abstract: I motivate the need for, and then sketch, an iconic theory of propositions according to which propositions are like or similar to their objects of representation. Propositions on this theory are properties that the mind instantiates when it simulates the world. I connect the theory to recent developments in the propositions literature as well as to a strain of cognitive science that explains some kinds of mental representation in terms of iconicity. To fill out my theory, I compare it to prominent theories in the contemporary literature.

"Modal Disagreement" (Email for draft)

-Abstract: I introduce an epistemic modal distinction---the first-person--third-person distinction---which, in addition to being interesting in its own right, helps explain epistemic modal disagreement. In particular, I claim that there are two different types of information sources involved in epistemically modalized propositions. One information source is a first-person epistemic state, or a group of epistemic states; another is a third-person, external source of information. This distinction helps make sense of felicitous and infelicitous responses in epistemic modal disagreement cases, which I go through in some detail.